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ABSTRACT

This paper considers the external debt cr~s~s of
Latin America and its impact on the economic development
of the area. The analysis covers four stages. First, it
will consider how the debt problem came to be what it is
now and the way in which it evolved into its present
circumstances. Second, it will address the reasons why
the industrial countries should worry about the debt
problems of the hemisphere. Third, it is also necessary
to examine what Latin America is doing to handle its debt
burden and its implication for the performance of its
economy. Fourth, some possible solutions to the defusing
of the remaining debt bombs, including those which have
not exploded yet, will be examined.
Finally, we
emphasize the need to integrate the debt problem with the
whole developmental strategy of the area in such a way as
to promote compatibility between the policies designed to
handle both issues.
This paper considers the external
should
America.

be

called

the

eternal)

debt

(which perhaps

crisis

of

Latin

The presentation is going to cover four stages.

First, it will consider how the debt problem came to be
what it now is and the way in which it evolved into its
present

circumstances.

Second ,

it will

address

the

reasons why the developed countries should worry about
it.

After all, why not allow the Latin Americans to stew

in their own handling of the foreign debt.

Third, it is

necessary to examine what Latin America

is doing to

handle

its

debt

burden

and

its

implication

performance of the Latin American economy.

for

the

Fourth, some

possible solutions to the defusing of the remaining debt
bombs,

those

examined.

which

have

not

exploded yet,

will

be

It will be shown that, as long as there is no

chain reaction

in the arsenal,

the eternity of the

problem should arouse interest, but not deep concern.
The origin of the crisis which erupted in 1982, goes
back to what occurred in the world economy in the 1950's.
What happened then was the resumption of the trends that
had worked for successful growth before, particularly in
the period from the 1870's to the First World war.
was a period in which the economies of

th~

This

world were

most influenced by the international economy to whose
trend they adapted.

However,

after World War I,

an

unrestful era began, which eventually erupted into the
crash of 1929.

The period that followed the crash was

inimical to the international economy, whose health began
to recover after the Second World War as it grew toward
.the relative levels that were normal

in the 1910' s.

Slowly at first, debt ratios began to build up.

If one

looks at the Latin American debt indicators in the early
1960's, in that historical context, problems are seen
cropping up already which began, even then, to worry some
doomsayers.
However, the characteristics of the international
economy differed in the fifties and sixties from what it
had been at the turn of the century.

Between 1950 and

1970, the developing countries became a major participant

in the world economy, something that was not the case
early in the century.

Furthermore, an environment of

decontrol, deregulation, floating exchange rates and so
on,

increasingly

illustrated

by

began

the

to

take

emergence

of

hold.
an

This

oil

was

cartel

of

developing countries, which wrested the control of this
crucial commodity from the major oil companies.
This set of circumstances eventually produced a
counter-reaction in the position of the U. S.
major countries of the West.

and the

They began to see that they

were losing their hegemony over the international economy
and,

moreover,

that

the

latter

was

affecting

their

domestic economies in detrimental ways.
Led by the ideas expressed in the late 70's by Paul
Volcker

(Chairman of the Federal Reserve System),

the

national economy of the U."S. changed radically from 1980
on, putting a damper on the growth of the international
economy

and

industrial

on

its

countries

dis inflationary

mode

inflationary
followed
set

in

creep.

suit.
the

product and financial markets.

In

The
the

domestic

other
end,

and

a

world

These conditions brought

about a crisis in the world economy that we are still
experiencing to some degree at present.
On

the

second

direction,

why

should

the

debt

problems of Latin America draw so much attention in the
West?

Why not allow these countries to solve their own

problems?

What payoffs can be expected by the developed

countries from their involvement in this issue?

These

questions can be answered straightforwardly if they are
considered in the context of the actual and growing size
of

these

countries'

economies.

The

gross

domestic

product (GOP) of Latin America can be estimated at about
$994b. in 1993, which is not insignificant when compared
to the total of the world economy.

The region's G.O.P.

increased by 4% in 1991, 3.1% in 1992 and 3.9% in 1993.
The

lackluster

performance

of

the

Latin

economies

eventuated in a 10% decline in the per capita income of
the area during the eighties.

Preliminary indications

also reveal an average increase of about 1.5% in GOP per
capita for the 1990-93 period.

Typically,

the Latin

economies are relatively closed economies, particularly
when compared to those in the Pacific Basin, and even
relative

to

the

European

ones.

Brazil,

by

far

the

largest country in the group is an illustrative case,
with its trade balance in goods and services representing
only 3.75% of its G.O.P.

in 1993.

Latin America had

already achieved, by the mid-1980's, a market size very
close to that attained by the European Common Market in
the middle sixties.

Thus,

the region is the largest

untapped market for the products, investment, technology
and

know~how

of the West.

In 1990,

the exports of goods and services from

Latin American countries amounted to $123.b.

In 1991 the

total value of exports had decreased to $121b.

The

corresponding figures for 1992 and 1993 were $126b. and
$132b., respectively.

As is evident, the exports of the

region are not even keeping pace-with the increase in
population.

Meanwhile,

the overall regional debt is

approaching the $l,lOOb. mark, which exerts a strong
pressure on future export performance in order to meet
credit obligations.
Far more important than the past are the immediate
prospects of Latin America.

By the year 2000,

its

population is expected to be approaching 600 million
inhabitants, which is going to be more than twice the
population of the united States, and double that of the
European Community.

By then, its GNP in 1985 prices will

probably be about $1.5 trillion.

This large figure is

something the Western world cannot afford to ignore.

On

the other hand, although the foreign debt will surpass
its present $534b. level by the end of the millennium, it
will not grow during this decade as fast as it did in the
1980-1989 period.

Looking into the next century, Latin

America is certainly going to be one of the major blocks
in the world, rivalling the European community and the
Pacific Basin in economic importance and in keen interest
to the United states as a powerful neighbor.
Also, from a political perspective, it is important
to realize that, even though a mUltiplicity of
exist

in the

Southern Hemisphere,

v~ews

Latin America

is

beginning to speak with one voice in economic issues,

often times adopting postures opposed to those of the
United states.

In political terms, the Contadora group

emerged as a recent example of a coilaborative Latin
effort undertaken despite significant U.s •. reticence.

On

another front, the cartagena Declaration Group on debt
matters,

has continued to meet,

Latin American point of view.

pressing on a common

For all the above reasons,

the Latin American debt crisis has to be given policy
priority

by

the

industrial

countries

as

the

Latin

American nations begin to play an increasingly important
role in the international stage.
As repeatedly stated, the decade of the eighties was
a most difficult period for Latin America.

The annual

average growth rate of the Latin American economies for
that period was only 1.1%.
the

annual

average

growth

expanding to 3.7% in 1994.

By contrast, for 1990-1993
rate

increased

to

3.4%

As for the foreign sector,

growth in the region's exports has been modest for the
early years of the present decade.

On the average,.

exports have risen by about $10b. annually for 1992 and
1993 relative to preceding years.
highly

favorable

if

This performance is

compared to events

in

1986 when

exports declined by 15%--of which 10% was in terms of
lower prices and 5% in reduced quantities.

As we know,

there was a relative improvement in the total value of
exports for the years 1987 and 1988.

Altogether, the

cumulative loss of purchasing power 'of Latin American

exports relative to imports due to the behavior of the
terms of trade for goods has been approximately of -21.0
between 1981 and 1990 (1980=100).
As for the nineties, the value of exports went up by
3.6% in 1991, 8.B% in 1992 and 6.2% in 1993.

Exports in

1994 reached $153b., a rise of over 14% relative to 1993.
However,

imports to the region have also climbed to

$171b. in 1994, an increase of 15% compared to 1993.

In

the latter year imports had expanded by B% in relation to
1992.
As

a

result,

experienced

a

19%

the

deficit

expansion

in

in

the

1994,

trade

balance

continuing

the

tendency towards a widening current account deficit which
itself
abroad.

is

financed

by

large

inflows of capital

from

Notice how that deficit has grown from $46b. in

1993 to $50b. in 1994, while capital inflows reached the
$65b. mark in 1993 and $57b. in 1994.

The cumulative

current account deficit from 1987 to 1994 has amounted to
approximately $lB5b.
This

means

capital abroad.
payoff

the

that

America

is

transferring

It uses part of its national savings to

interest

remitted abroad.

Latin

and dividends

that

have

to be

Instead of the area being helped in its

process of development by capital infusion,
opposite has happened.

just the

Latin America has transferred

capital to the advanced countries to the tune of $180
billion during the period 19B7-1994, representing close

to

20%

of

product

and

surpassing its yearly exports of gbods and services.

Not

surprisingly I

its

annual

these

gross

trends

national

were

reflected

in

a

substantial decrease in the gross domestic investment
figures of the area from 1980 to 1990.

In fact,

the

average annual growth rate of gross domestic investment
during that period was -3%.

A recovery of sorts has

occurred in 1990-1993, with a 7.2% annual growth rate
recorded for that index.

Meanwhile, the regional debt

rose by close to 6% in 1994,

reaching the figure of

$534b., slightly higher than 50% of the G.D.P. of the
region for that year.
stood at 40%

Meanwhile, the debt service ratio

for that same date,

the second highest

figure since 1986.
It can be concluded from this brief analysis of how
Latin America has been recently evolving, that things are
not going well given the adverse circumstances faced by
these countries.

The Latin American nations have been

practically cordoned off from foreign direct investment
(only $15b.

in 1994),

and their terms of trade have

continued to deteriorate.

In light of the preceding, it

is surprising that the region is growing at all, and that
in fact it is more than covering its population growth,
which has been about 1.9% annually for the period 19901993.

The urgent need to resume per capita product

growth in the area, and its appropriateness
the

foreign

policy

goals

of

the

U.S.

in terms of
was

finally

recognized in the Baker and Brady plans.

The concepts of

growth with domestic and economic adjustment is a major
overall contribution to both the intellectual vision and
the policy approach to the debt crisis.
As to the formulation of definitive solutions to the
crisis, specific proposals have never seemed appropriate
thus far.

Yet,

there are general propositions that

should be considered as premises from which to derive
wide-ranging policy measures.
close

and

interdependent

development and trade.

First, acknowledge the

relationship
Second,

between

debt,

recognize that world

economic conditions; particularly those in commerce and
finance, are the principal exogenous determinant of the
degree of amelioration of the debt crunch.

Nothing can

really help as much as a growing, healthy international
economy.

Third,

understand that policy coordination

among the leading economies in the world is essential.
After the number of attempts at economic summitry in the
last decade and a half, this appears to be now happening
for the first time.
the

The Group of Five has been leading

economic coordination efforts among the Western

economies.

These have included monetary,

exchange rate policies.
at

hand,

it

would

fiscal and

In order to address the problem
appear

that

extending

policy

coordination to diminishing protectionism on debt-ridden
country

exports,

and

promoting

acceptance

of

the

principle of sharing the burden of relief with developing

countries, are constructive and timely steps.

Fourth,

from the Latin American point of view, it is important to
open the region's economies more to international trade.
A traditional lack of export orientation has been their
Achilles heel. for most of the Post-Was period.

Latin

America has been losing its share in world exports during
this

period

particularly
countries

and

this

when

it

are

now

has
is

to

change

realized

important

drastically,

that

exporters

of

developing
industrial

products.
Finally, the institutional way of handling the debt
problem has to be changed.

This was partly proposed

already by the so called Baker Plan.
the World Bank

(lBRD)

Instead of the IMF,

should now bear the brunt of a

revival in Latin American lending policy, through the
window of policy and structural loans change recently
opened by the IBRD.

The short-term loan conditionality

which characterizes the fund, now becomes long-term under
the new conception.

In the managing of the debt, the

private banks and the industrial countries' governments
cannot be far behind in supporting this novel approach.
This

is

a

welcome

financial

and economic

innovation

because it transforms the substance of the problem from
short term adjustment to long term growth.

These two

objectives are incompatible and simply cannot be pursued
simultaneously

in

Latin

America.

reconcile them has already created many

The

attempt

c~mplications

to
in

the form of inconsistencies for decision makers down
there.

The success of these developmental policies is

required if voluntary lending is ever to return from the
cold, buoyed by renewed confidence on the ability of
Latin America to service its debt through sustained
growth.
Once again, it is necessary to distinguish between
the amelioration of the debt problem and its solution.
Practically all of the measures adopted since the crisis
of 1982 fall

in the former category.

Rescheduling,

rollovers, emergency lending packages by international
institutions and private bankers, the conversion of debt
into equity or long term public bonds, the reduction of
interest rates, the adjustment of the outstanding debt
total to actual market values, payments in kind or in
currencies other than those in which obligations were
contracted, and other like measures, do not address the
central issue.

Namely, the institution of a sustained

process of real wealth creation in the debtor countries.
This is the fundamental basis and necessary condition on
which any permanent resolution of the debt situation must
rest.

The alternati ve to development can only be, .in the

end, the default of debt,

wh~chcould

hardly be regarded

as a satisfactory solution to all parties concerned.
Even the partial or total assumption of the principal by
international

institutions,

unlikely

as

it

may

be,

through the floating of negotiable documents, would not

constitute, properly speaking, a "solution", but rater a
salvaging operation beyond the normal.realmof economic
relations

as presently defined

in the 'international

system.
It is in the· above context that the early Brady
plan, whose particulars have not yet been fully

specifi~d

(and probably will never be) may constitute a definite
advance beyond the type of ameliorative measures tried in
the

past.

Its

central

thrust

is

reduction of the principal of the debt.

directed

at

the

It thus squarely

addresses the fundamental issue of the debt problem.

By

reducing the weight of the debt burden itself, it frees
the debtors'
purposes.

resources permanently for developmental

In this sense, the plan constitutes a new

departure, a true qualitative change, in the approach to
the solution of the problem.

Once again, a true and

lasting resolution of the debtor' s situation requires the
resumption of a high and sustained growth process.
in

turn,

depends

on resources

available to accomplish the task.

and

efforts

This,

becoming

The Brady plan signals

a beginning in the right direction.
We should stop for a moment to broadly consider the
criticisms leveled at the Brady plan by academics and
functionaries-.
enough

It has been said that it is not ambitious

in scope;

that

it has not been defined and

detailed as rigorously and minutely as it should; that it
works too slowly; that it is too lenient on the creditor

banks and excessively harsh on the debtor nations; that
the plan, in supporting the I.M.F., demands for LDC's to
adopt severe adjustment policies that indirectly promote
social and political instability in those countries; that
it does not succeed in motivating bankers to restart the
flow of fresh capital funds to accelerate the development
process in LDC's, especially in Latin America; that in
the end, it will not work because the guarantees given by
debtor

countries

sustained growth.

will

not

hold

in

the

the

various

consideration.

of

All of this not to speak, on the other

side of the issue, about the cost to the
of

absence

deals

either

u.s.

completed

taxpayers
or

under

In short, many countries thing that the

Brady Plan is not well conceived to meet the needs of
developing countries and that, in a few words, it is a
classic

example

of

a

too

little,

too

late,

policy

measure.
Obviously,

in evaluating the Brady Plan, we are

clearly facing a judgmental matter.

One opinion with

regard to the panoply of objections raised against the
Plan will depend on our selection of criteria to measure
its success, and on the relative weight ascribed to its
different goals and objectives, as well as on the set of
restrictions and parameters bounding the Plan's operation
that we choose to allow for.

Many outcomes are possible.

Therefore, a reasoned critique of the Brady Plan should
include information on the evaluative instruments and

__"",,""VJ,.ogy

applied

in

reaching

one's

conclusions.

However, it should also be pointed out that even if these
requirements were to be fulfilled,

they would not be

sufficient to establish a verifiable conclusion.

the

reason being that a truly encompassing analysis of the
effects of the Plan would have to include an in-depth
study of the realistic alternatives to
practical feasibility.
scenarios

Without examining the alternative

that

may

be

in

the

absence

probability

it and their

obtained
of

with
the

a

degree

Plan,

no

of

truly

documented position could be taken on this issue.
Obviously, this is not the opportunity to undertake
such

a

laborious

Consequently,

we

and

will

highly
limit

technical

ourselves

to

task.
state,

admi ttedly based on our own impressionistic perception of
the very complex socio-economic and ideologico-political
situation

characterizing

not

only

Latin

American

in

general, but the developed and formerly socialistic block
countries as well, that the Brady Plan can be considered
a reasonably effective policy tool.

This is not to say

that it cannot be improved upon which, without question,
it can.

For example,

bankers should be stimulated to

become more heavily involved in financing the medium and
long-term needs

of· the

region.

Complementary trade

liberalization and promotion steps should be promptly
implemented in order to increase the commercial flow
between Latin America and the developed nations' markets.

The fine tuning and tailoring of the Brady Plan to the
specific needs and circumstances of each debtor nation
has to be further worked out.

Also, much remains to be

done by way of integrating each modified or individual
version of the plan with the structural and functional
features of each nation's developmental blueprint.
Undoubtedly,

the

debt

problem

has

served

to

highlight the structural changes that have taken place in
the international political and economic systems in the
last four decades.

The less developed countries are now

an integral part of those systems.

Their function is no

longer a peripheral and subservient one.

This means that

their economic and even social policies must dovetail
with those of the developed world.
time,

these

complete

developments will

revamping

of

the

In the course of

inevitably
international

lead

to

a

economic

institutions. Likewise, the domestic fiscal and monetary
policies of developed countries will have to strive for
greater consistency and harmony for the sake of attaining
mutually desired goals in the international arena.

Less

obvious at this point in time but ultimately equally
unavoidable,

will be the requirement of coordinating

these policies with the domestic and external needs and
functions of the less developed nations.
The institutional arrangements negotiated at Bretton
Woods are now clearly passe.

Naturally, it will take

time for the full consciousness required for change to

take place, to emerge and solidify.

Gradual modification

and evolution rather than wholesale restructuring will in
all

probability

prevail.

but,

in

the

end,

a

new

institutionalization of the international system,

now

looming in the horizon, will come into its own.

This new

order will not necessarily consist exclusively of new
organizations put, more importantlY, it will have to be
infused

with

realization

a

new

that

spirit.

growth

in

That

developed

development in less advanced ones,
and finance,
policies,

is,

of

a

vivid

countries

and

international trade

exchange rates, commercial and investment

along

with

domestic

social

and

economic

programs, will have to be coordinated and made compatible
for the sake of stability and mutual prosperity.
In the above context, the so-called debt crisis may
be symptomatic of things to corne and a harbinger of the
new mentality and kind of perspective that seems destined
to gradually gain ground in the realm of international
affairs.
Just

like

constitution

of

historical
a

new

evolution

network

of

required

institutions

the
and

arrangements at the end of the Second World War, which
made viable sustained growth in developed countries and
growth through trade in poor ones,
demand new changes and fresh views.
of the world economy and policy has
that

it

is

no

longer

the present times
The interdependence

reach~d

possible

to

such a point,
conduct

a

compartmentalized, purely national or regional policy.
In our own days, the almost continuous negotiations among
industrialized countries,

vide the Venice and Louvre

agreements, the pressure upon Japan for this nation to
liberalize its trade, the exhortations of Secretary Baker
for Germany to
presence,

in

stimulate

fact,

of

its economy,

an

vouch for

international

the

system quite

different from the one in existence forty years ago.
What

does

not

seem

quite

so

although in fact this is the case,

evident

to

many,

is that the less

developed nations are already a part of this new reality.
In other words, compatibility, coherence and coordination
of goals and policies on the part of developed and less
developed nations is now an inescapable necessity if
crisis of one sort or another are to be avoided in the
future.
In

closing,

let

it

be

repeated

that

the

new

perspective on the solution of the Latin American debt
crisis,

calls

for

the

devising

and

adoption

of

a

comprehensive domestic and international set of policies
that will result in the reinvigorating of international
trade, investment and lending policies, along with the
resurgence of domestic savings and capital formation,
leading to the kind of growth rates in excess of 5%
annually that characterized the decades of the fifties,
sixties and seventies.
brought back,

This kind of performance,· if

would make of the external debt not a

burden

and

contrary,

an

unproductive

dead-weight

as has been traditional

but,

on

the

in the history of

economic development, a lively sign of vigorous growth
and

long-term expansion.

The

solution

of' the

debt

problem is for the debt not to be a ballast that impedes
growth but for the debt to become, through its role in
wealth creation,

a

stimulus and prod to growth.

An

increasing debt can be a healthy sign of growth,

just

like Adam smith in the Wealth of Nations said back in
1776 that

increasing

growing wealth.

salaries were

an

indication

of

On the contrary, a large and increasing

debt has no "solution" if it doesn't cease to be part of
the problem in order to become part of a true solution to
the economic problems of developed and underdeveloped
countries alike.
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